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51	 INTRODUCTION
1.1	 Background
The increased numbers of maritime security problems during the last decades 
have forced international societies to organize closer co-operation and create bet-
ter plans to response to the problem. At the moment, the greatest security chal-
lenge globally is piracy and armed robbery. Therefore, International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) chose piracy and response orchestrating for the theme of the 
World Maritime Day in 2011. Also United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon has been highlighted that “the escalating problem of piracy off the coast of 
Somalia requires urgent and coordinated response”.
Maritime security threats are not a serious problem in the Baltic Sea nowadays. 
Still, some smaller events and also the global nature of maritime have shown that 
security threats are worth recognition and discussion in the Baltic Sea region. Eu-
ropean Security Research and Innovation Forum, ESRIF has assessed scenarios 
in the future, in 2030. These scenarios embraced a range of risks, from natural 
to man-made incidents. ESRIF has stated that capabilities and capacities have to 
be mobilized to deliver equipment and services to deal with these risks. (ESRIF, 
2009.) Finnish security committee has highlighted the need to shift the focus of 
preparedness proactively to active participation and the identification of threats 
and disorders as early as possible and to convey the situational picture quickly. 
(Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2010.) 
Maritime safety is widely studied and for example maritime safety risks are rather 
well known and analyzed. In contrast, maritime security issues are not studied as 
much, and security threats in the maritime industry are not defined and analyzed 
systematically, with the exception of threats caused by terrorists and piracy. Glo-
bally, concentration on these more serious security threats is understandable, but 
for example systematic identification and analyzing of all identified threats and 
risks is relevant in Europe, more particularly in the Baltic Sea region. These are 
for example the aims of the Finnish Baltic Sea Security Research Network whose 
members are Finnish authorities responsible for maritime security. These are also 
the aims in the MIMIC project that are presented in more detail in the next sub-
chapter.
1.2	 MIMIC	project
This report is a part of work package 3 (WP 3) of the project “Minimizing risks 
of maritime oil transport by holistic safety strategies” (MIMIC). The aim of the 
6whole project is to develop a probabilistic model that integrates the models related 
to traffic, accident probabilities, ecosystem impacts and the response possibilities 
of the society to decrease the likelihood and the consequences of the hazards. An-
other aim of the project is to use this model to create effective measures and rec-
ommendations for holistic maritime safety strategies. Recommendations are based 
on the analyses using the integrated model concerning how the risk management 
system should be modified so that the probability for an accident is minimized by 
the given public and private resources.
The partners of the project are Kotka Maritime Research Centre, Centre for Mar-
itime Studies at the University of Turku, Kymenlaakso University of Applied Sci-
ences, Aalto University, University of Helsinki, Tallinn University of Technology, 
University of Tartu, Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute and Finn-
ish Environment Institute. The MIMIC project’s cost estimate is approximately 2 
Million Euros, and its duration from May 2011 to the end of 2013. The project is 
funded by the European Union and it has been approved to be a flag ship project 
of the EU. The financing comes from the European Regional Development Fund, 
The Central Baltic INTERREG IV A Programme 2007-2013; Centre for Econom-
ic Development, Transport and the Environment of Southwest Finland (VARELY); 
the City of Kotka; Kotka-Hamina Regional Development Company (Cursor Oy); 
Kymenlaakso University of Applied Sciences; Finnish Environment Institute; Uni-
versity of Tartu; Tallinn University of Technology and Swedish Meteorological and 
Hydrological Institute.
Work package 3 focuses on security threats of oil transports in the Baltic Sea. The 
main objective of the study is to determine security related threats in the area and 
assess them in terms of safety and security. One reason to select oil transportations 
as a target transportation mode for this study has simply been the availability of 
written documentations and reports concerning the safety related risks of the oil 
transportations, thus giving some benefit for the analyzing work. The analyzing 
method of security threats will be chosen during the project. Finally, based on the 
gathered and analyzed information, proposals for development of countermeas-
ures against identified risks will be defined.
1.3	 The	purpose	and	objectives	of	the	report
The report aims to present the latest relevant research results and studies related to 
the maritime safety and security issues, which form the basis and theoretical back-
ground for the whole research. In this report, both maritime safety and security is-
sues will be discussed, but the primary focus is on maritime security issues.
The purpose of the report is to study current maritime security issues. The re-
search question of this literature study can be defined as follows:
•   How comprehensive safety concept of maritime transport can be defined?
7The aim of the MIMIC project is to assess security threats, and a preliminary con-
cept of comprehensive security approach will be defined and presented at the end 
of this report. This definition is based on the contents of the chapters 2-5.
The main focus of the project is on threat identification and risk assessment which 
are the essential parts of risk management practices. Theoretical background of 
this literature review and the study that will be carried out in WP 3 is described in 
more detail in chapter 2.
1.4	 The	limitations	and	essential	terms
As mentioned earlier, WP 3 of the MIMIC project focuses on mainly oil transport 
related safety and security issues in the Baltic Sea. It could be difficult to limit the 
study only to oil transport because the security threats are not only linked to oil 
transport and many security experts may be unable to distinguish the threats of 
other shipping types, such as containers, and ro-ro. However, during the project, 
we will see how the selected perspective is possible to keep.
Although we will identify and record maritime security threats in the Baltic Sea, 
this report is not solely focused on the Baltic Sea area. The perspective is wider and 
more general. The special principles of the Baltic region and threats relevant in the 
Baltic Sea and identified from the literature will be presented in the next report.
Although often maritime safety and security issues are dealt with separately, they 
are often difficult to distinguish between each other. Because of it we have chosen 
to use a comprehensive approach of safety and security in analyzing the identified 
threats. That is why we have included in this report also maritime safety matters. It 
is important to understand basic principles and structures of maritime safety. Still, 
because the focus is more on maritime security and because maritime safety is so 
widely studied and reported, the concept is only shortly introduced. 
The essential terms in the report are Maritime Safety and Maritime Security. 
These terms are defined follows (del Pozo, Dymock, Feldt, Hebrard & Monteforte, 
2010, 45-46):
Maritime Safety: The combination of preventive measures intended to protect 
the maritime domain against, and limit the effect of acciden-
tal or natural danger, harms, damage to environment, risk or 
loss.
Maritime Security: The combination of preventive and responsive measures to 
protect the maritime domain against threats and intentional 
unlawful acts.
The other related terms (hazard, threat, risk, risk assessment and risk analysis) will 
be presented later in the following chapters.
8It has not been possible to develop a common theory for safety and security. Ac-
cording to the psychologists Teemu Reiman and Pia Oedewald (2008) who have 
studied safety critical organizations the present fourth era of safety research high-
lights multidisciplinary and perceiving entities. That is because safety cannot be 
understood by means of the approaches.
Because there is no common theory for safety and security, we have chosen three 
theories that reflect and also guide our project. These are traditional engineering 
approach to risk management, resilience theory and complexity theory. Thus, we 
have chosen both traditional approaches and newer theories that help to under-
stand the whole phenomena better and take into account for example complexity 
of the systems. These theories are shortly described in the following sub-chapters. 
Finally, a synthesis of the theories is presented in the last sub-chapter.
2.1	 Traditional	risk	management
Safety critical industries, like aviation and nuclear industry, as well as maritime in-
dustry have tried to manage safety (and security) issues using tools such as safety 
and risk management systems. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 
2008) has defined that: “Safety risk management is the other core activity that sup-
ports the management of safety and contributes to other, indirectly related organiza-
tional processes. The term safety risk management, as opposed to the more generic 
term risk management, is meant to convey the notion that the management of safe-
ty does not aim – directly – at the management of financial risk, legal risk, econom-
ic risk and so forth, but it restricts itself primarily to the management of safety risks”.
For example, International Safety Management Code (ISM) and International Ship 
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) codes include the basic requirements for 
these kinds of management systems in the maritime industry. The basic philos-
ophy of these kinds of management systems is to identify all hazards (or threats) 
that might endanger operation, and through risk assessment process find the most 
severe risks which should be removed or minimized (see e.g. ICAO, 2008). The 
methods to remove or minimize the identified and analyzed risks are called risk 
management practices. Basic risk analyzing process is described in chapters 5.1 
and 5.2.
Risk analysis process depends on the model of accident causation. Arguably, the 
best known and most widely referred accident model is James Reason´s Swiss 
Cheese Model of Accident Causation (see the figure 1).
2	 THEORETICAL	BACKGROUND
9Figure 1. Professor James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation (Duke 
University Medical Center, 2005).
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The Swiss cheese slides in the model present the layers of defenses against poten-
tial error (active failures) impacting the outcome. These various defences are built 
deep into a safety critical system to protect against fluctuations in human per-
formance or decisions with a downside at all levels of the system. The holes of the 
cheese refer to existing latent conditions that could lead to breaches in the systems 
defences. (ICAO, 2008.) If accidents happen like the Reason´s model shows it, the 
risks are possible to find by searching of the combination of failures and condi-
tions. Then, likelihood of weakened defenses and its combinations are evaluated 
during the risk assessment process. (Hollnagel, 2008.)
2.2	 Resilience	theory
Some experts have stated that instead of risk management we should learn to tol-
erate the fear and also recover from it (Airaksinen, 2011, according to Hanen & 
Huhtinen, 2011). Resilience theory is focused on these requirements. The frame-
work and philosophy of the theory is very similar to the complexity theory de-
scribed above.
The terms safety and risk stem from engineering tradition where risks are relat-
ed to unreliable system components, human or technological. In contrast, resil-
ience engineering focuses on how systems can be managed under varying and un-
predictable conditions. Furthermore, safety assessment is usually focused on what 
can go wrong and how this could be prevented. However, in resilience engineer-
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ing safety assessment is focused on what goes right, as well as on what should have 
gone right. (Hollnagel, 2008.)
2.3	 Complexity	theory
As mentioned earlier, there is no common theory for safety and security. Accord-
ing to Hanen and Huhtinen (2011), this is because safety and security are not only 
a complicated, but also complex and tightly interconnected matters. When several 
factors are effective in a situation the result is usually unpredictable and the cause 
consequence relation is difficult to determine.
All human systems are complex because they are multidimensional in social, cul-
tural, political, physical, technical, economic and other dimensions which interact 
and influence each other. Complexity theory studies social systems holistically and 
therefore, it examines all factors that interact and influences each other. (Goergen, 
Malline, Mitleton-Kelly, Al-Hawamdeh, Hse-Yu Chiu, 2010.)
Formal counting risk assessment helps to understand only partially the hazards of 
socio-technical systems: it is very difficult or even impossible to predict potential 
problems related to the flow of information and for example potential hazards or 
security threats (Turner et al. 1997, according to Hanen & Huhtinen, 2011). When 
describing complexity systems, theoretical terms are used often although closely 
connected interaction fits rather poorly to the framework of systems thinking. An 
organization defined as a system considers its future known and deterministic. It 
also acts through rational planning process in order to achieve continuous stabili-
ty. In contrast, complexity thinking considers the future unknown and constructs 
it all the time – the future can be influenced and is complex and paradoxal. (Lin-
dell 2011, 56-71.)
2.4	 Conclusion
We have chosen two different views for this study, namely the traditional engi-
neering approach and resilience and complexity theory that, instead of risk anal-
ysis of small components, study the systems holistically (complexity theory) and 
concentrate how to tolerate the fear and how to recover from it (resilience theory). 
Resilience theory also encourages us to observe what can go right contrary to tra-
ditional engineering approach which seeks the possible failures and errors.
Based on the theories described above, we have decided to gather information 
about maritime security threats in the Baltic Sea region employing two methods. 
One method is based on the traditional risk management: that is asking maritime 
security experts to estimate the most relevant threats in the area and to evaluate 
the probability of occurrence and consequences. We will also analyze the threats 
using the certain analyzing method that will be developed during the project. This 
11
analysis will be taken into account from the standpoint of both the security and 
safety and therefore we can have more holistic approach to the study. We will al-
so study the security threats using an expert method Delphi to study complex sys-
tems. The methods and following phases of the study have been described in more 
detail in chapter 7.
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As described in the first chapter (1.4), the definition of maritime safety refers to 
accidental and natural danger, harm or damage while maritime security refers to 
intentional events. Often maritime safety has been defined as a combination of 
safety and security related aspects.
The main goal in the development of maritime safety is the prevention of acci-
dents. When considering the prevention factors, the maritime safety must be first 
defined as well as its main factors. According to another definition, maritime safe-
ty is the safety of life and protection of property at sea from the environmental and 
operational threats, as well as the safety of maritime environment from pollution 
by the ships (Urbański, Morgaś & Mięsikowski, 2009). 
Marine safety can be defined as follows consisting of four following components:
1. External safety, such as safe fairways, ports, safety equipment, environmen-
tal conditions. Typically these aspects are taking care of fairway designers, 
civil engineers, PIANC, IALA etc.
2. Internal safety, such as the ship’s structure, the ship’s damage stability, as-
sessment of commercial premises, etc. Typically this sector of the safety is 
taking care of naval architects, Classification societies, Port state Control 
etc.
3. Human factor and which maybe forms the most interesting part of the safe-
ty definition. It is a known fact that roughly 80 % of all incidents and acci-
dents are caused by human factor, thus this factors form the most essential 
item for the safety improvement plans. Typically this aspect is taken care by 
crew onboard, navigation skills, safety culture onboard and in the shipping 
company, human-machine interaction, VTS, etc.
4. Environmental impacts result from the complex interactions between the 
above-mentioned factors. (Nyman et al. 2010, 12.)
One important safety factor not mentioned in the above list is organizational fac-
tor. One term that includes both human factors (mariner´s impact to safety) and 
organizational factors (whole the company´s impact) is operational safety. Michael 
Salter (2006) has studied operational safety and has determined it as following: 
human factors (or people), working conditions (or equipment), operational pro-
cedures and organizational culture (and safety management system). As Interna-
tional Safety Management Code (ISM Code) has developed in order to force ship-
3	 MARITIME	SAFETY
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ping companies to take liability of the safety and security matters of their shipping 
operations, this kind of operational safety should be taken into the definitions of 
maritime safety.
Aviation is very often used as a reference domain when searching for best safety 
management practices because aviation safety has strongly improved during the 
last decades. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has created safety 
management system and guidelines for the aviation companies and national states. 
First, the safety concept is described in the safety management manual (ICAO, 
2006). The concept includes the following connotations:
a) zero accidents (or serious incidents), a view widely held by the travelling pub-
lic;
b) the freedom from danger or risks, i.e. those factors which cause or are likely to 
cause harm;
c) the attitude towards unsafe acts and conditions by employees (reflecting a 
“safe” corporate culture);
d) the degree to which the inherent risks in aviation are “acceptable”;
e) the process of hazard identification and risk management; and
f) the control of accidental loss (of persons and property, and damage to the en-
vironment).
ICAO´s (2008) Safety Management Manual also defines safety: “as the out-come of 
the management of a number of organizational processes. The management of these 
organizational processes has the objective of keeping safety risks under organization-
al control. Key in this perspective is the notion of safety as outcome, and safety risk 
management as process”. So, aviation domain highlights the responsibility of or-
ganizations (shipping companies in this context) and risk management in safety 
ensuring process.
3.1	 Maritime	hazards
In spite of the criticism against traditional risk management (see the previous 
chapter 2), it is still considered by safety experts a cornerstone of safety manage-
ment and one of the most important tools to prevent accidents (see chapter 5.1). 
Furthermore, hazard identification is the most important step to manage mari-
time safety risks.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 2008) has defined a hazard as 
follows: “Hazard is a condition or an object with the potential of causing injuries to 
14
personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability 
to perform a prescribed function”. Thus, wind or other weather conditions are one 
example of the maritime hazards.
Supposedly, comprehensive lists of the maritime hazards do not exist, but of 
course many kinds of lists have been made. One list of maritime hazard has made 
in the study of maritime safety on short sea shipping. The hazard list is a combi-
nation of the researchers´ question list in the study and the answers of the open 
questions by the respondents, see enclosure 1. (Lappalainen, Storgård, Tapanin-
en, 2012.)
3.2	 Maritime	risks
Safety risks are defined by ICAO (2008) as follows: “Safety risk is defined as 
the assessment, expressed in terms of predicted probability and severity, of the 
consequence(s) of a hazard taking as reference the worst foreseeable situation”. 
According to this definition, the example of a maritime hazard in the previous 
subchapter, wind, is not a risk, but the possible consequences that the wind can 
cause, are. For example, if a ship´s master is unable to maneuver the vessel dur-
ing adverse wind conditions in a harbor, the possible consequence, e.g. a collision 
with a port construction, is a risk. Thus, typically the possible accidents and in-
cidents are maritime safety risks. Perhaps the most known maritime risks can be 
found from the following picture of Maritime accident types (Kristiansen, 2006).
 
 
KUVA 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Maritime Accident Types (Kristiansen, 2005). 
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The intentional acts are meant when the word security is used. In contrast, safe-
ty refers to unintentional events. Traditional safety concept reviews primarily ran-
dom accidents, failures, errors, mistakes, malfunctions, and any result from these 
possible damages. Security’s point of view brings to the examination of planned, 
appropriate actions whose aim is to influence harmfully to selected target. It is 
spoken in the context of sabotage, vandalism, terrorism, piracy, theft, espionage, 
or a variety of threats for the operations. The concept of security often also refers 
to organized criminal activity, such as tax evasion, extortion, smuggling and hu-
man trafficking, which are primary to design to produce a benefit for them. (Ny-
man et al. 2010, 14.)
Maritime security definitions as well as security threats and risks are discussed in 
this chapter. The threats are first defined and listed according to the literary sources 
and after that they have been classified in the meaning of our following phases of 
the project. Also, the threats are described more in detail in this context. 
4.1	 Maritime	security	definition
There are many definitions and meanings for the terms “security” and “maritime 
security”. The meanings depend on who is using the term or in what context it is 
being used (Klein, 2011). Next, some definitions have been collected for the terms 
“security” and “maritime security” from literature.
Natalie Klein (2011, 4) discusses in her book of Maritime Security and the Law of 
the Sea the definition of the term security and states that from an academic per-
spective security has several meanings depending on the theoretical school. For 
example, The Copenhagen School (Bradford, J. 2004, according to Klein, 2011, 4) 
claims that:
“Security is a socially constructed concept and that discourse is a key element in the 
construction and identification of security issues. Based on the discourse which sur-
rounds it, a public policy issue can be classified as non-politicized, politicized or se-
curitized. - - A securitized issue is identified as a potential threat to the continued ex-
istence of the state. Once securitized, issues are perceived to be of such immediate im-
portance that they are elevated above the ordinary norms of the political debate and 
the state acquires special rights to adopt extraordinary measures in order to protect 
itself ”.
4	 MARITIME	SECURITY
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Based on literature and interviews of enterprises Genserik Reniers (2011) has de-
fined security as: “taking all preventive measures in order to avoid harmful inci-
dents caused by unauthorized (internal or external) persons who intend to seriously 
damage the company, as well as controlling such incidents and their adverse effects”. 
Finnish Ministry of Defence defines comprehensive concept of security as follows 
“The comprehensive concept of security comprises security issues which, if exacer-
bated, may turn into threats that can jeopardize or seriously harm Finland, Finns or 
the functions vital to Finnish society. Wide-ranging threats include premeditated ac-
tion such as the use of military force, terrorism or interference with information net-
works. They can also occur spontaneously, such as widespread failures of the electric 
grid or extreme forces of nature”. (Ministry of Defence, 2010.)
Natalie Klein (2011, 8) has stated that different actors use different meanings for 
the term maritime security. For example, military perspective on maritime securi-
ty highlights different matters than maritime industry. US Naval Operations Con-
cept refers to the aims of maritime security operations such as “ensuring the free-
dom of navigation, the flow of commerce and the protection of ocean resources, as 
well as securing the maritime domain from nation-state threats, terrorism, drug traf-
ficking and other forms of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction 
and illegal seaborne immigration” (Chief of Naval Operations, 2004, ref. to Klein, 
2011)
In contrast for ship owners, maritime security mainly implies a transport system 
and relates to the safe transport of cargo without interference or being subjected to 
criminal activity (Raymond & Morrien, 2008, according to Klein, 2011, 8). Refer-
ring to this ship owner´s view, Steven Jones (2006) explains in his book “Maritime 
Security” that the concept of security for them is “the state of a shipping company/
vessel/crew/port, being of feeling secure“, or “the safety of a shipping company/ves-
sel/crew/port against such threats as terrorism, piracy, and other criminal activities”. 
The United Nations Secretary-General has said that there is no agreed definition 
of maritime security, and instead of trying to define it he identifies what activities 
are commonly perceived as threats to maritime security (UNGA, 2008). The mar-
itime security threats will be defined and described in the following sub-chapters.
4.2	 Security-related	threats	and	threat	scenarios
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2007, 27) presents the term “threat” as 
follows: “Threat is a based on a group’s (or subject’s) intent and capability and is 
a measure of how likely the success in carrying out some activity that may cause 
harm.“
According to the preliminary study of this MIMIC project, the most typical threats 
toward vessels, their crews, passengers and/or cargoes or infrastructure and opera-
tion of maritime transportation are sabotage or other intentional damage or distur-
17
bance, terrorist attack, hijack / piracy, blackmailing and threatening, theft and vio-
lence. Maritime transportation can be strived to utilize in criminal operations e.g. 
smuggling of forbidden goods, human trafficking or arrangement of illegal arrival to 
country, or terrorist attack / damage against external object. (Nyman et al., 2010, 32.)
UN’s convention treaty (Nyman et al., 2010) and ISPS Code by International Mar-
itime Organization list illegal acts related to maritime environment that can be 
considered security threats:
• intentional pollution, illegal emission
• smuggling and trafficking illicit drugs and psychoactive substance
• piracy
• armed robbery
• hijacking of the ship or of the persons on board
• terrorist attack
• use of the ship to carry those intending to cause a security incident  and/or 
their equipment
• use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or de-struction
• nuclear, biological and chemical attack
• blockage of the port entrances, locks, approaches etc.
• tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems  or ship’s stores
• taking hostages
• stowaways
• smuggling weapons or equipment
• trafficking illegal firearms, their parts and components and ammunition
• illegal fishing
• damage to, or destruction of, the ship or of a port facility, e.g. by explosive de-
vices, arson, sabotage or vandalism
• environmental activist. 
Threat scenarios and possible disturbances have been defined in the Finnish Soci-
ety Security Strategy. These scenarios are defined in order to secure the functions 
vital to society, and they are: serious disturbances in the power supply, serious dis-
turbances in the telecommunications and information systems – cyber threats, se-
rious disturbances in transport logistics, serious disruptions in public utilities, se-
rious disturbances in food supply, serious disturbances in the financial and pay-
ment systems, disruptions in the availability of public funding, serious disturbanc-
es in the health and welfare of the population, major accidents, extreme natural 
phenomena and environmental threats, terrorism and other criminality that en-
danger social order, serious disturbances in border security, a political, econom-
ic and military pressure and the use of military force. (Ministry of Defense, 2011.)
This Strategy provides a comprehensive approach, but there are also several threat 
scenarios that have a close connection to the maritime domain. These maritime 
related threats and their connections to the defined disturbances are listed in the 
enclosure 2.
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According to Finnish Defense (2011), threats may be studied from the perspective 
of the cause, by the way they manifest themselves or by their effects. In practice, 
maritime threat scenarios encompass a wide range of potential and individual sce-
narios which have distinct features. A relatively current report prepared for U.S. 
Congress (CRS, 2007) identifies five common dimensions of maritime threat sce-
narios. These dimensions are perpetrators, objectives, locations, targets and tac-
tics.
Perpetrators:  Indentifying potential perpetrators is important because perpe-
trator capabilities vary widely and there-fore bear on the types of 
acts they might attempt.
Objectives: Perpetrators have different objectives for their acts. They may 
seek to cause human casualties, economic loses, environmental 
damage, insecurity and fear among people or other negative im-
pacts. Potential consequences for each scenario have to be con-
sidered and how well they correspond to the potential perpetra-
tors’ objectives.
Locations: Where a potential attack could occur. Perpetrators’ objectives and 
target selection limits the potential locations for attack.
Targets: The potential targets for an attack. Understanding the potential 
targets’ capabilities and objectives may offer valuable insight into 
credibility of attack scenarios.
Tactics: The number of tactics used in the attacks has been identified. Ar-
tificial selection is limited by perpetrators’ capabilities, objectives 
and selection of the target.
 
TAULUKKO 1 
Table1. Example Maritime Attack Characteristics (CRS, 2007, 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimensions Example Characteristics 
Perpetrators 
• Al Qaeda and affiliates            
• Islamist unaffiliated                  
• Foreign nationalists 
• Disgruntled employees            
• Others 
Objectives • Mass casualties                           • Port disruption 
• Trade disruption                          
• Environmental damage 
Locations • 360+ U.S ports                             • 165 foreign trade partners • 9 key shipping bottlenecks 
Targets 
• Military vessels                           
• Cargo vessels                               
• Fuel tankers                                 
• Ferries / cruise ships  
• Port area populations               
• Ship channels                               
• Port industrial plants                 
• Offshore platforms 
Tactics 
• Explosives in suicide boats     
• Explosives in light aircraft       
• Ramming with vessels              
• Ship-launched missiles             
• Harbor mines 
• Underwater swimmers             
• Unmanned submarine bombs  
• Exploding fual tankers              
• Explosives in cargo ships         
• WMD in cargo ships 
Table 1. Example Maritime Attack Characteristics (CRS, 2007, 7)
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Table 1 provides a set of illustrative characteristics which could serve as the basis 
for the development of potential threat scenarios. Based on different combinations 
of perpetrators, objectives, locations, targets and actions it is possible to combine 
a large number of logically consistent and operationally credible threat scenari-
os. Acts can be carried out in so many different ways that realistically it is impos-
sible to shelter from them all. The key facture is then the ability to distinguish real 
and significant security resources and measures in the right targets. (Nyman et al., 
2010; CRS, 2007, 2-7.)
4.3	 Classification	of	the	threats
Different threats are described in this sub-chapter. The threats are classified into 
nine categories for the incoming study. The nine sections are: destroying the ma-
rine environment, illegal fishing, smuggling, stowaways, piracy, terrorism, envi-
ronmental activist, vandalism and theft.
Destroying the marine environment 
In this study the matter of destroying the marine environment is only a review 
from the perspective of security such as illegal emissions and intentional pollu-
tion.
It is prohibited to discharge into sea noxious liquid substances which have not 
been categorized, provisionally assessed or evaluated. Also any deliberate dispos-
al of wasters or other matter from the ship is prohibited. (HELCOM, 2009, 6,9.)
Illegal fishing
Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing destroys marine habitats, drains fish 
stocks, puts honest fishers at an unfair disadvantage, and weakens coastal commu-
nities, especially in developing countries. (European Commission Fisheries, 2011.)
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 2001) defines ac-
tivities that refer to illegal fishing as follows:
”Illegal fishing refers to activities:
• conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a 
State, without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and 
regulations;
• conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant re-
gional fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the 
conservation and management measures adopted by that organization and by 
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which the States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable interna-
tional law; or
• in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those un-
dertaken by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management 
organization. “
Smuggling
Majority of illegal drugs is smuggled in ships. This presents a significant chal-
lenge to commercial vessels and seaports. In terms of volume, the world’s larg-
est illicit drug product is cannabis, that is, the production of cannabis herb, fol-
lowed by cannabis resin. The second largest illicit drug production is related to co-
caine followed by heroin. Amphetamine-type stimulants are produced in quanti-
ties comparable to heroin. (McNicholas, 2008, 189; UNODC, 2011, 19.)
Stowaways
Stowaway is a person who hides in a ship or cargo without the consent of the Mas-
ter or of any other authorized by the Master. Majority of persons who becomes 
a stowaway are looking for better life for themselves and likely to their families. 
Stowaways are linked to people smuggling and human trafficking. People smug-
gling and human trafficking are two different concepts. In people smuggling, the 
migrants are willing participants and organized criminals profit from facilitating 
their immigration. Human trafficking occurs when the intention is to exploit migrants 
in their destination.  (Bist, 2000, 228; McNicholas, 2008, 173; Jones, 2006, 28.)
The UN Trafficking Protocol highlights the importance of exploitation: “Traffick-
ing in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, harboring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of ab-
duction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnera-
bility or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of 
a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Ex-
ploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of oth-
ers or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or prac-
tices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” (Jones, 2006, 28.)
Piracy
Michael McNicholas defines piracy in his book ”Maritime Security An Introduc-
tion” as follows: “An assault on a vessel, cargo, passengers, or crew, usually from 
another vessel while at sea by persons acting for personal gain and not acting behalf 
of any recognized flag or International authority. Also includes acts of rioters who 
attack a ship from the shore for the purpose of theft or of passengers who attack the 
ship and its personnel from on board”. 
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Terrorism
United Nations define that terrorism is any action that is intended to cause death 
or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants when the purpose of such 
an act is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. (Jones, 2006, 2.)
According to the Finnish Ministry of Defense, there is no generally accepted 
definition for terrorism. Usually it refers to violent, illegal, national or international, 
activity or the threat of violence with the objective of causing unrest and deep fear. 
The aim of a terrorist act is typically to force political leaders to give in to the 
terrorists’ hopes. Terrorists often seek and exploit visibility in the media in order 
to achieve their goals.” (Ministry of Defense, 2011.)
Environmental activist
Environmental activism is the combined political force of people who take action 
to protect the environment. The green movement is inspired by proactive oppor-
tunities to promote its vision of a better world.  (OnWorld, 2012.)
Vandalism
Vandalism can be difficult to define because of the fact that evaluation of behavior 
depends on the perspective chosen. Three different approaches can be with focus 
varying between the damage, actor and context. (Christensen, H., Johnson, D., 
& Brookes, M. 1992.)
Point of view of the caused damage, the actor and the observer must be included 
into definition of vandalism. Despite the variety of the behaviors, the motivations 
that originate it, the diversity of targets and the consequences of damage caused 
the following definition can be proposed:
“Vandalism is a voluntary degradation of the environment with no motivation of 
profit whatsoever, the results of which are considered as damage by the actor(s) as 
well as by the victim in relation to the norms that rule the situation.” (Christensen, 
H., Johnson, D., & Brookes, M. 1992.)
Theft
According to Washington State of Legislature (2004), theft is defined to be:
(a) To wrongfully obtain or exert unauthorized control over the property or services 
of another or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of such property or 
services; or
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(b) By color or aid of deception to obtain control over the property or services of an-
other or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of such property or serv-
ices; or
(c) To appropriate lost or misdelivered property or services of another, or the value 
thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of such property or services.”
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Some possible analytical tools for assessing maritime security risks are described 
in this chapter. This is not a complete list, and the methods employed are based on 
their relevance for the project.
First, conventional risk assessment and Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) method 
that is based also on traditional risk management process are described. After that, 
there is a short chapter about Delphi-method. Finally, some of the qualities of risk 
assessment tools used to evaluate security risks are listed. Because the analyzing 
method that will be used in this study will be developed later by a commissioned 
study, we have not added detailed information of available assessment tools.
5.1	 Conventional	Risk	assessment
In order to assess risk, it is important to be aware of the distinction between 
hazard and risk. European Commissions’ “Guidance of risk assessment at work” 
defines hazard and risk as following definitions:
Hazard: The intrinsic of property or ability of something (e.g. work materi-
als, equipment, work methods and practices) with the potential to 
cause harm.
Risk: The likelihood that potential for harm will be attained under the 
conditions of use and/or exposure, and the possible extent of the 
harm.
European Commission has defined the term “risk” comprehensively. Criminal In-
telligence Service Canada (2007, 25) in turn presents the term “risk” in more de-
tail as follows: “Risk refers to the uncertainty that future events and outcomes. It is 
measured in terms of likelihood and harm (consequences) of an event with the po-
tential to influence the achievement of an important objective. Often expressed as: 
Threat + Vulnerability = Risk.
The conventional approach defines risk as being the chance of an accident or ad-
verse occurrence. The process of risk assessment and management is generally 
based on the following three steps:
1. “The assessment of risk in term of what can go wrong, the probability of it 
going wrong, and the possible consequences,
5	 ANALYTICAL	TOOLS	TO	ASSESS	SECURITY	RISKS
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2. The management of risk term of what can be done, the options and trade-offs 
available between the cost, the benefits and the risks, and
3. The impact of risk management decisions and policies on future options and 
undertakings.“ (Bichou, 2008, 4-5.)
When there is a need for more extensive risk assessment, these following five steps 
can be used: identifying hazards and those at risk, evaluating and prioritizing risk, 
deciding on preventive action, taking action and Monitoring and reviewing. (Eu-
ropean Agency for Safety and Health at Work.)
Risk assessment is a comprehensive and systematic method to identify and 
evaluate risks to health and safety. Risk management priorities are determined 
by evaluating and comparing the level of the risk against predetermined stand-
ards and other criteria. It also involves the decision between suitable control 
measures to prevent loss, damage or injury. The assessment should include 
the controls required to eliminate, reduce or minimize the risk. Risk analy-
sis is a part of the risk assessment. Risk analysis consists of quantification of 
objects limits, identifications of hazards and evaluations of risk. Risk assessment 
requires a comprehensive analysis (European Commission, 1996, 11; Intelli-
gence Service Canada, 2007, 26; Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö, 2003.)
5.2	 Formal	Safety	Assessment	(FSA)
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is a structured and systematic analysis tool. It 
aims at enhancing maritime safety, including protection of life, health, the marine 
environment and property. FSA study includes five steps: identification of hazards, 
risk analysis, risk control options, cost benefit assessment and recommendations 
for decision-making. The FSA process starts with the definition by the decision-
makers of the problem that will be assessed along any relevant boundary condi-
tions or constrains. (IMO, 2007, 3, 5.)
The purpose of step 1 is to identify and prioritize by risk level a list of hazards and 
associated scenarios which could lead to significant consequences. A combination 
of creative and analytical strategies is used for hazards identification. The output 
from step 1 is a list of hazards and their associated prioritization by risk level and 
descriptions of causes and effects (IMO, 2007, 8-9.)
The probabilities of occurrence and consequences of the most important scenarios 
identified in step 1 are being investigated in step 2. This can be achieved by using 
proper techniques that model the risk. The output from step 2 provides the iden-
tification of the high risk areas which need to be addressed. (IMO, 2007, 9-10.)
The aim of step 3 is to create risk control options (RCOs) that address both exist-
ing risks and risks introduced by new technology or new methods of operation 
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and management. A range of RCOs which are assessed for their effectiveness in 
reducing risk, a list of interested entities affected by the identified RCOs and a table 
stating the interdependencies between the identified RCOs are the output from 
this step. (IMO, 2007, 10, 12.)
Benefits and costs associated with the implementation of each RCO identified and 
defined in step 3 are in step 4 identified and compared. Cost and benefits should 
be as comprehensive as possible. The output from this step is costs and benefits 
for each RCO identified in step 3, costs and benefits for those interested entities 
which are the most influenced by the problem in question and cost effectiveness 
expressed in terms of suitable indices. (IMO, 2007, 12-13.)
Step 5 defines recommendations which should be presented to the relevant de-
cision makers in an auditable and traceable manner.  The recommendations are 
based on the comparison and ranking of all hazards and their underlying caus-
es. The output from this step comprises an objective comparison of alternative 
options, based on the potential reduction of risk and cost effectiveness, in areas 
where legislation or rules should be reviewed or developed and feedback informa-
tion to review the results generated in the previous steps. (IMO, 2007, 13.)
5.3	 Delphi	method
Delphi method is defined by Linstone and Turoff (2002) as follows:
“Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group communication 
process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, 
to deal with a complex problem” (Linstone and Turoff, 2002, 5).
In addition, the authors (Linstone and Turoff, 2002, 6) claim that there will be 
need for using Delphi method in the following cases:
• “The problem does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques but cart benefit 
from subjective judgments on a collective basis
• The individuals needed to contribute to the examination of a broad orcomplex 
problem have no history of adequate communication and may represent diverse 
backgrounds with respect to experience or expertise
• More individuals are needed than can effectively interact in a face-to-face ex-
change
• Time and cost make frequent group meetings infeasible
• The efficiency of face-to-face meetings can be increased by a supplemental group 
communication process
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• Disagreements among individuals are so severe or politically unpalatable that the 
communication process must be refereed and/or anonymity assured
• The heterogeneity of the participants must be preserved to assure validity of the 
results, i.e., avoidance of domination by quantity or by strength of personality 
(“bandwagon effect”)”.
5.4	 Security	assessment	tools
There is no consensus between risk assessment experts how to analyze security 
risks. A major challenge in risk analysis of security issues is that a terrorist or in-
tentional actor, unlike engineered systems, is intelligent and may adapt to the de-
fensive measures. Because of this adaptive nature, it is arguably problematic to as-
sess probabilities of the security events or use traditional probabilistic risk analysis 
tools (PRA tools), such as event trees. Also, alternative tools e.g. extended forms of 
games or decision trees might be better solutions. (Ezell, Bennett, von Winterfeldt, 
Sokolowski & Collins, 2010.)
Ezell et al. (2010) have, however, stated in their study that it is possible to assess 
probabilities of terrorism risks and for example use event trees as a risk assessment 
tool. They indicate that the developed alternative tools have also limitations, and 
their conclusion was that multiple approaches in combination are needed to ad-
dress the complex issue of terrorism. (Ezell et al., 2010.)
According to Ezell´s team, methodology is not so much a challenge for the De-
partment of Homeland Security as how best to consult, incorporate, and trans-
form relevant intelligence information into reasonable inputs for security risk 
analysis. In turn, the National Research Council´s Committee on Methodologi-
cal Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security´s Biological Agent 
Risk Analysis has advised that when modeling bioterrorists, adversaries have to 
be assumed to make always the choice that maximizes his or her objectives. On 
that account, the focus should be on terrorism attack probabilities outputs of de-
cision models, rather than incorporating intelligence information as input. (Ezell 
et al., 2010.)
There are many other security assesment tools found in literature e.g. PRA-based 
methodologies, logic trees, influence diagrams, Bayesian network analysis and 
game theoretic models. These tools are studied and analyzed more in detail in the 
following phases of this MIMIC project.
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According to complexity theory, it is difficult to distinguish individual events from 
the whole (look at the chapter 2). Also, some expert has said that safety and se-
curity are difficult to distinguish from each other. Consequences of any security 
event, such as terrorist attack or smuggling human beings may cause harm to peo-
ple. Because of that, safety risks have to be included in the risk assessment of se-
curity threats. Also, the Advisory Board of our project, Finnish Inter-agency Bal-
tic Sea Network for Security Research, guided us to study the links between safety 
and security risk factors and risks. Thus, we wanted to study how to combine safe-
ty and security in the terms of their structures.
One way to combine safety and security is from the point of view of vessels or sea 
transports, and see all safety hazards or security threats as sources of a common 
risk factor that may cause harm to vessels or sea transport. This is a typical exam-
ple for the authorities or states that try to estimate general levels of safety and se-
curity for a certain domain or industry. One good example of this is the Finnish 
security strategy where the potential objects of threat are described. “Sea trans-
ports are particularly critical for the functioning of society. In normal conditions, 
sea transports and vessels may be threatened by, among other things, disturbances 
in transports of critical materials or port functions, restrictions of maritime traffic, 
threats posed by vessels themselves as well as terrorism and accidents. In distur-
bances, maritime traffic may be impeded by the Gulf of Finland becoming non-
navigable, sabotage against vessels and ports, restrictions against using foreign ter-
ritorial waters or ports as well as the out flagging of Finnish-registered vessels. 
The vulnerability of transports to disturbances is on the increase and valid insur-
ance on vessels, cargo and crew constitute a necessary precondition for the contin-
uation of maritime traffic. When transport risks increase there may be a dramat-
ic rise in insurance costs and international reinsurance markets cease to function. 
Decision-making of the Finnish transport business regarding key issues is gradu-
ally migrating abroad.” (Ministry of Defense, 2011.) 
A Finnish model of corporate security based on the thought that there are sever-
al parts of security (and safety) (YTNK, 2009). If all these sections are managed by 
same basic functions and principles, well-functioning safety (and security) man-
agement system and safety culture is possible to achieve. The security and safe-
ty parts of the model are presented in the figure below. Personnel, reputation, en-
vironment, information and property are the targets (in the middle in the figure) 
that are protected by corporate operations.
6	 DEVELOPING	COMPREHENSIVE	SECURITY	
APPROACH
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Safety and security aspects and various actors in the maritime field are illustrated 
in figure 4 below (Security subcommittee, 2010). 
The key factor for the total safety concept is the wide co-operation between the re-
al business related actors (shipping companies, ports, stevedoring companies) and 
governmental bodies (customs, maritime administrations, coast guard). The inter-
national character of the maritime business and certain features of the concept of 
security will underline the necessity of the regional co-operational of municipali-
ties and governmental offices with the international domain.
Figure 3. The sections of corporation security (YTNK, 2009). 
Figure 3. The sections of corporation security (YTNK, 2009)
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7.1	 Summary
The purpose of this report was to create an actual review on maritime oil trans-
portation security threats and to acquire preliminary information for the design-
ing of holistic safety concept of maritime oil transport which was the main object 
of research in this literature review. The traditional safety is focused on stochastic 
events, failures, malfunctions, errors and consequences related to these events. Se-
curity view concentrates on intentionally planned actions and missions by which 
the initiators will make harm or distress to the selected target. Typical actions be-
longing to this category are sabotage, vandalism, terrorism, piracy, theft, espio-
nache and various threats for normal operations.
The main research question in work package 3 (identification and assessment of 
security related risks) is defined as follows: How comprehensive safety concept of 
maritime transport can be defined?
This report aimed to create the theoretical background and framework for the 
project. It was discovered that there were many issues which have to be taken into 
account when the comprehensive safety concept of maritime transport is defined. 
The list of maritime security threats which have been received as an outcome of 
this report have been utilized for forming the questions of theme structural inter-
views. Additionally, preliminary knowledge for the analyzing of maritime security 
threats was obtained. This knowledge will be used for selecting the most applica-
ble analyzing tool for the assessment of maritime security threats.
The guidelines for the theoretical background will be made based on this litera-
ture review. Conventional risk assessment is used and will be used for analyzing of 
preliminary outcomes of theme structural interviews. Because the assessment of 
security threats is a very complicated and complex matter, other analysis methods 
such as Delphi will be used also.
7.2	 Following	phases	of	project
In the following section, the research problem and the applied research method of 
the whole work package 3 (identification and assessment of security related risks) 
are reviewed.
7	 CONCLUSIONS
30
Research problem
The main purpose is to identify, gather and assess security threats, scenarios and 
risks related to marine oil transportation in the Baltic Sea. In this report, security 
threats have been gathered from literature. The following phase of the project will 
involve interviews of the experts of maritime security such as security managers of 
ship owners, oil harbors and authorities. 
Answers to research problem will be sought by the following sub-research ques-
tions: 
• What kind of security threats of maritime (oil transportation) sector will be 
targeted to Baltic Sea area?
• How the security threats could be analyzed from the comprehensive safety 
point of view?
• What kinds of actions are needed for the development of comprehensive 
safety of maritime sector, when the security threats are also taken into ac-
count in risk management?
The planned research method will be presented in the next chapter.
Research method
After this literature review, the project will be continued by empirical research. 
The collection of empirical material will be based on the list of maritime security 
threats which has been classified in paragraph 4.3. The continuing study will con-
centrate on two empirical research materials which are:
1.  Maritime security threats and scenarios collected by structural theme inter-
view and
2.  Material gathered by Delphi survey.
The majority of empirical material of maritime security threats and scenarios will 
be collected, specified and verified by Delphi survey. According to the definition 
(see chapter 5.3.), the Delphi method will be suited to the processing of complicat-
ed and changing problems and subjects such as the scenarios of maritime security 
threats stand for. The Delphi method was chosen because it will clearly highlight 
the views of specialists.
The main aim is to choose a comprehensive group of specialists for evaluating the 
matter in question. Then the aspects of threats and scenarios will be presented to 
the specialists who will answer anonymously. In this study, the group of specialists 
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consists of authorities, representatives of oil shipping companies and oil ports in 
Finland and perhaps in Sweden. 
Structure of study
The study will be carried out in several parts. The first part of the study will be ex-
ecuted as a structured theme interview. At the same time, the development of the-
oretical tool (method or model) for analyzing the maritime security threats and 
scenarios will be started. The theoretical method or model for estimation of se-
curity threats will be developed as a subcontract. The subcontract will be a study 
about alternative ways to analyze maritime security threats. With the aid of the 
theoretical method or model, optional approaches will be produced to process, 
estimate and analyze the maritime security threats at the Baltic Sea. Seriousness, 
probability and / or resilience of consequences for maritime security threats can 
be classified. The suitability of For-mal Safety Assessment (FSA) procedure for es-
timation of security threats should also be estimated in the study. The second part 
of study will follow after execution of interviews and development of analyzing 
tool. 
In the second part of the study the received identified threats and threat scenari-
os will be estimated by the developed theoretical method. Various aspects and ar-
guments of maritime security threats and scenarios will be produced based on the 
information received from theme interviews and preliminary assessment of secu-
rity threats by developed analyzing tool. Thereby, the structured theme interviews 
together with analyzing method or model will produce material for the next phase 
of study which will be Delphi. 
Delphi has been described in chapter 5.3. The aspects and arguments of maritime 
security threats and scenarios will be presented to the selected group of specialists. 
There will be 3-5 rounds of aspects or arguments. The accurate variation of Delphi 
survey will be decided later.
Finally, after the results, discussion, formation of synthesis and answer to the re-
search question will be executed.
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Enclosure	1
List of maritime hazard (Lappalainen, Storgård, Tapaninen, 2012)
• deteriorated ships,
• growth of ship size,
• competency of seafarers,
• fatigue of seafarers,
• safety culture onboard vessels,
• safety culture in shipping companies,
• complexity of maritime safety legislation,
• amount of bureaucracy,
• incompetency of maritime administration,
• lack of VTS authority,
• congestions in fairways,
• amount of dangerous cargoes,
• inadequate traffic arrangements,
• breaking the sea route rules,
• lack of pilotage obligations,
• safety devices (deficient maintenance or planning),
• nautical charts (deficient corrections or planning),
• lack of information about navigation conditions,
• marine insurers are not interested in real ship conditions, and
• sanctions are not enough serve,
• challenges of winter navigation,
• quality of equipment onboard a vessel,
• differences between flag states in standards of implementation and moni-
toring of safety regulation,
• number of mariners onboard,
• motivation of mariners,
• communication problems due to lack of language skills,
• high turnover of workers between ships and shipping companies, and
• monotonous watch keeping tasks.
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Possible disturbances and their connection to threat 
scenarios in the strategy
Serious dis-
turbances in 
transport logistics
Major accidents, 
extreme natural 
phenomena and 
environmental 
threats
Terrorism and 
other criminali-
ty that endanger 
social order
Serious dis-
turbances in 
border security
Disruption in the availability, transmission and distribution 
of electricity
x x x
Disruption in the functioning of telecommunications and 
information systems
x x x x
Damage in the ICT infrastructure x x x
Disturbance in the nation-wide radio and television 
broadcasts
x x
Transport disruptions x x x x
Disruptions in the availability of imported fuels x x
Disruption in the fuel supply x x x
Disruption in the supply of non-durable consumer goods x x
Disruption in the water supply x x x
Disruption in waste management x
Failure of district heating x x
Failure of financial transactions x
Disruption in the availability of cash x x
Collapse of the credit rating of the state and municipalities
Downfall of the solvency of reinsurance cover of an 
insurance company
A pandemic or other widespread outbreak of serious 
infectious disease
x x x
A serious animal or plant disease outbreak x x x
Mass extinction of species x x x
Declining conditions in primary production x
Widespread contamination of soil of waters x
A storm or flooding and a dam disaster x x
An accident relating to CBRNE hazards x x
Land, sea or air traffic accident x x x
An accident affecting Finns or action taken against them 
abroad
x x
A terrorist attack or a clear threat thereof x
A criminal act that widely endangers the population x x
A criminal act that widely endangers functions in society x x
Jeopardized border security x x
Major influx of asylum seekers x x x
Adversely influencing the State´s capability to function x
Disruption in foreign trade x x x x
Threatening with WMD x x
Information operation x x
Provocative violation of territorial integrity x
An armed incident x x
The use of military force attempting to surprise x x
A large-scale use of military force x x x x
Enclosure	2
Possible disturbances and their connections to threat scenarios (Ministry of De-
fense, 2011).
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